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ANTITRUST: CRIMINAL INTENT IN ANTITRUST
PROSECUTIONS, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND
SECTION 5(a) OF THE CLAYTON ACT, AND
THE RELATIONSHIP OF STANDING AND
INJURY IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS
C. PAUL ROGERS III*
This article will treat in some detail three developing areas of antitrust law: (1) the requirement of proof of criminal intent in antitrust
prosecutions; (2) the relationship of collateral estoppel and section 5(a)
of the Clayton Act; and, (3) the necessity of establishing antitrust standing and/or antitrust injury to successfully maintain a private action. In
each section, recent contributions of the Seventh Circuit will be highlighted.
CRIMINAL INTENT IN ANTITRUST PROSECUTIONS

The Seventh Circuit's decision in UnitedStates v. Brighton Building
*& Maintenance Co. I was one of the first to consider the impact of the

United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co. 2 The Gypsum Court had held that proof of criminal
intent was a necessary predicate to a conviction under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 3 In Brighton, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Gypsum
on its facts, holding that the criminal intent requirement did not extend
to per se offenses under the antitrust laws.
Several corporate and individual defendants were convicted by a
jury in Brighton of rigging bids for the construction of an expressway.
The government showed that the defendants had agreed on a bid submission procedure whereby participating firms would be assured of
submitting the low or the only bid for a specified project. The trial
judge, acting before Gypsum was decided, instructed the jury that a
finding of specific intent to violate the law was not necessary to convict
"for the parties are deemed to have intended the necessary and direct
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A.. J.D.,
University of Texas; LL.M., Columbia University. The author gratefully acknowledges. the diligent and able research assistance of Jannette Freeman, Candidate for J.D., Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law.
I. 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979).
2. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

consequences of their acts." '4
On appeal, the defendants argued that the excuse of proof of specific intent, together with the development of per se rules of illegality,
had turned the Sherman Act into a strict liability statute for criminal
defendants of per se offenses.5 The defendants further asserted that
due process requires the inclusion of mens rea in a criminal statute that
sweeps as broadly as the Sherman Act because of the frequent lack of
notice to a defendant that his conduct is prohibited by the statute. 6 Additionally, the defendants argued that the 1974 congressional upgrading of the Sherman Act offenses from misdemeanors to felonies, with
concomitant increases in penalties, underscores the necessity of imply7
ing a mens rea element into the statute.
Although the Gypsum decision was not handed down until after
the briefs were filed and oral arguments completed in Brighton,8 the
Seventh Circuit considered the implications of Gypsum at length. 9 In
Gypsum, several major gypsum manufacturers, together with various of
their corporate executives, were charged with violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the price of gypsum board.' 0 The
allegedly illegal conduct involved a system of price verification among
the manufacturers. The government argued that the manufacturers
concertedly followed a practice of telephoning competing producers to
determine prices on gypsum board currently being charged to specific
customers." According to the government, the effect of the price exchange plan was to stabilize prices in the industry.
The trial court charged the jury that the defendants' purpose was
essentially irrelevant if the jury found that the effect of price verification "was to raise, fix, maintain or stabilize prices."' 2 The jury was
advised that "the parties are presumed, as a matter of law, to have in4. 598 F.2d at 1104.
5. Brief for Appellants at 30-32, United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979) (hereinafter referred to as Brief for Appellants]. Appellants argued that
the combination of per se offenses and the lack of a requirement of intent left possibly innocent
persons solely in the hands of prosecutorial discretion, the implication being that conviction could
occur in any case the prosecution decided to bring. Id. at 41, 45. See Mercurio, Antitrust CrimesTimefor Legislative Doqnition, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 437, 442-47 (1976).
6. Brief for Appellants, supra note 5, at 34-42. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957).
7. Brief for Appellants, supra note 5, at 29, 43-46.
8. The Gypsum decision was handed down on June 29, 1978. The oral arguments in Brighton were held on June 13, 1978 and the Seventh Circuit's opinion was issued on May 18, 1979.
9. 598 F.2d at 1105-06.
10. 438 U.S. at 426-28.
I1. Id. at 429.
12. Id at 429-30.
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tended [to fix prices]" if the effect of the price exchanges was to raise,
fix, maintain, or stabilize prices. 13 Further, in language almost identical to the jury charge later upheld in Brighton, the Gypsum trial court
informed the jury that "the law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts." 14 The jury found each of
the corporate and individual defendants guilty.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the convictions' 5 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the limiting nature of the jury instructions alone constituted
reversible error.16 In so holding, the Court implicitly parted with precedent' 7 and held, for the first time, that intent is a necessary element of
a criminal Sherman Act violation.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, expressed the view
that proof of mens rea is the rule rather than the exception in criminal
prosecutions under the Anglo-American common law, even where the
statute involved does not specifically require criminal intent.' 8 Although noting that strict liability crimes do exist, 19 the Chief Justice
thought it inappropriate to impose such sanctions in the antitrust context because of the broad, open-ended nature of the language of the
Sherman Act which "does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely
13. Id at 430.
14. Id
15. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
16. 438 U.S. at 459. The Third Circuit had reversed the convictions primarily on the ground
that the "meeting competition" exception to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21
(1976), constituted a defense to the price verification scheme if defendants could establish that
their sole purpose in engaging in the practice was to establish a defense to price discrimination
charges. 550 F.2d at 126. On this point, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Third Circuit,
holding that interseller price verification was not necessary to establish a section 2(b) "meeting
competition" defense. 438 U.S. at 453. The Court stated that "a good-faith belief, rather than
absolute certainty, that a price concession is being offered by a competitor is sufficient to satisfy
the § 2(b) defense." Id The Court concluded that actual price verification by a seller would rarely
be needed to meet the good-faith standard. Id at 454. For discussion of this aspect of the Gypsum
case see Handler, Antitrust 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1407-11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Handler; Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 288-95 (1978). For detailed, pre-Gypsum discussions of the meeting competition defense see Note, Meeting Competition
Underthe Robinson-PatmanAct, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1476 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Meeting Competition]; Note, Antitrust Liabilityforan Exchange of Price Information-W*hat Really Happenedto
Container Corp., 63 VA. L. REV. 639 (1977) [hereinafter cited as What Really Happened].
17. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525 (1913); see text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
18. 438 U.S. at 436, quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). Contra,
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See generally Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107.
19. 438 U.S. at 438.
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identify the conduct which it proscribes. '120 The judiciary, in developing flexible and adaptable standards such as the rule of reason, has not
if it were primarily a criminal statute,
interpreted the Sherman Act as
21
Chief Justice Burger asserted.
The Chief Justice then noted that the type of conduct proscribed
by the Sherman Act, with the exception of per se offenses with known
anticompetitive effects, "is often difficult to distinguish from the gray
zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct."' 22 The imposition of liability because of anticompetitive effects,
without inquiry into intent, would create, according to the Chief Justice, "the distinct possibility of overdeterrence" and would transform
the criminal sanctions of the antitrust laws into a regulatory rather than
penal role.2 3 The Chief Justice concluded that the criminal offenses
proscribed by the Sherman Act must include criminal intent as an element because "the same basic concerns which are manifest in our general requirement of mens rea in criminal statutes . . . are at least

equally salient in the antitrust context."24
In Brighton, the Seventh Circuit recognized that Gypsum established, as a general proposition, that intent is an element of a Sherman
Act criminal offense. 25 However, the Seventh Circuit perceived a significant factual difference in Gypsum which it believed distinguished
the two cases. Since the price verification plan in Gypsum, unlike the
bid-rigging scheme in Brighton, was not a per se offense, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Gypsum was not applicable uniformly to per se
26

violations.

The Brighton jury had been instructed that, in order to convict, it
must find that the defendants knowingly participated in a conspiracy
whose purpose was to bring about an unreasonable restraint of trade.
20. Id.
2 1. Id at 439.
22. Id at 441.
23. Id The Chief Justice also viewed the recommendation of the 1955 Attorney General's
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws and the revised Antitrust Division Guidelines that criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act should be reserved for "egregious" or "willful" conduct
as evincing the same concerns as "are manifested in our general requirement of mens rea in criminal statutes." Id at 439, 440 n.15. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 349 (1955); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967).

24. 438 U.S. at 440.
25. 598 F.2d at 1106.
26. Id. The court did not specifically address appellants' argument that the lack of mens rea
created strict liability for antitrust defendants for what was now a felonious crime. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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The jury was further advised that bid-rigging isperse an unreasonable
27
restraint of trade.
The Seventh Circuit did not believe that Gypsum required an instruction of "intent to restrain trade" once the defendants were found
to have intentionally made an agreement which is per se unlawful. In
the court's view, per se rules are substantive rules of law which define
illegal conduct. 28 Apparently, the intent requirement is fulfilled in per
se cases by proof of an intentional agreement or conspiracy the purpose of which is to commit aper se violation of the law, without proof
that the defendants intended the unlawful result or had knowledge of
29
the probable consequences of their acts.
Two other circuits, in cases decided almost contemporaneously
with Brighton, independently agreed with the Seventh Circuit's restrictive view of the criminal intent requirement. In United States v. Foley, 30 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that real estate brokers accused of fixing commission rates on residential sales were not entitled to jury instructions which would require a
finding of specific intent to restrain trade. 3' In Foley, the Fourth Circuit found sufficient the trial court's charge requiring, for conviction,
findings that the "defendants must have known that their agreement, if
effectuated, would have an effect on prices; that they knowingly joined
a conspiracy whose purpose was to fix prices; and, that in joining they
intended to further that purpose." 32 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found, as
did the Seventh Circuit, that proof of knowing participation in a conspiracy to fix prices was sufficient evidence to convict in a per se case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
United States v. Gillen,33 expressed, in unequivocal language, the same
view as the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. In affirming a conviction for
price-fixing in the anthracite coal industry, the court first concluded
that Gypsum acknowledged that price-fixing cases are an exception to
the criminal intent requirement in antitrust prosecutions. 34 Further,
the court asserted that, even if Gypsum was applicable, the intent re27. 598 F.2d at 1107.
28. Id at 1106.
29. The court found it sufficient that "the jury was instructed that in order to convict it must
find that defendants were knowing members of a conspiracy whose purpose was to effect an unreasonable restraint on interstate or foreign commerce and that bid-rigging is regarded as unreasonable per se." Id. at 1106.
30. 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979).
31. ld at 1335.
32. Id at 1336.
33. 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979).
34. Id at 544.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

quirements will always be met in a case involving a price-fixing conspiracy. The court went on to note that, "[i]f a defendant intends to fix
prices, he necessarily intends to restrain trade. ' 35 In agreeing with the
Seventh and Fourth Circuits, the Third Circuit stated that in pricefixing conspiracies "no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent
36
beyond proof that one joined or formed the conspiracy. '
The intent standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Gypsum
requires proof that defendant undertook the proscribed conduct with
knowledge of its likely effects or probable consequences. 37 The stricter
standard of proof of a "conscious desire" to restrain trade was rejected
as "both unnecessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome. ' 38 Given
this moderate mens rea standard, a formal requirement of intent to restrain trade may be, as asserted by the Third Circuit, superfluous inper
se cases. It would seem unlikely that defendants who have engaged in
conduct sufficiently predatory as to fall within a per se rule could be
39
said not to know the probable effects of their actions.
According to the Gypsum Court, the jury in such a situation may
draw an inference of knowledge based upon the anticompetitive result
of the suspect conduct. 40 In rule of reason situations, where, by definition, the conduct may be found reasonable, the drawing of an inference
of knowledge of probable effect is problematical. However, such an
inference would almost invariably follow per se offenses once the illegal agreement or conspiracy was established. For example, in Brighion, once the jury found that the defendants had entered into a
conspiracy to rig bids, the inference that the defendants knew that their
scheme would probably affect the operation of free competitive bidding
35. Id at 545.
36. Id See also United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704, 716 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (holding that Gypsum did not change requirement that the government must show that

defendants acted knowingly rather than with specific intent).
37. 438 U.S. at 446. The Court pointed out that the type of intent under consideration was
"the more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy" rather than "the basic intent
to agree, which is necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy." Id.at 443 n.20, citing W.

LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 464-65 (1972). See also Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941).
38. 438 U.S. at 446. Apparently, conduct undertaken with the express purpose of producing
anticompetitive effects would also support criminal liability, even if the proscribed effects did not
actually result. The Court, by limiting its holding to situations where anticompetitive effects have
been demonstrated, implicitly suggested that the higher standard of intent may be applicable
where no anticompetitive effects result. Id at 444-45 n.21.
39. Justice Stevens, who disagreed about the propriety of a judicial imposition of a mens rea
standard, recognized the limited practical value of the majority's "knowledge" test for intent. Id.
at 475-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Handler, supra note 16, at
1399-1400; Comment, United States . United States Gypsum Co.: Putting a Lid on Container,45
BROOKLYN L. REV. 417, 434-35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Putting a Lid].
40. 438 U.S. at 446.
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would seem to be inescapable. 4'
However, even if the refusal of the circuit courts to require proof
of criminal intent inper se prosecutions has little practical significance,
it is still appropriate to question the courts' limitation of Gypsum to rule
of reason cases. If the Supreme Court intended mens rea to be an indispensable element of all antitrust criminal suits, then that burden,
even though minimal, should be borne by antitrust prosecutors.
Gypsum did not expressly exceptper se offenses in articulating the
scienter criterion. And, at least superficially, Brighton, Foley, and Gillen appear to contravene the spirit of Gypsum by imposing strict criminal antitrust liability in spite of Supreme Court language rejecting, for
a variety of policy reasons, such an interpretation of Sherman Act culpability. The tenor of the Gypsum decision suggests that mens rea
should be a required element of all criminal offenses unless recognizable circumstances direct otherwise. Although intent is omitted from the
statutory language, the Court in Gypsum determined that, "Congress
will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our
-42
traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor ....
'43
Strict liability offenses were characterized as "generally disfavored.
However, closer analysis reveals that the circuit courts' distinction
of Gypsum is supportable and perhaps inescapable. As noted, the
Supreme Court's decision revolved around policy considerations. The
Court believed that the fact that the Sherman Act contained broad language resulting in open-ended standards, such as the rule of reason,
applicable to an indeterminate range of conduct mandated inclusion of
a mens rea element. Often, the Gypsum Court noted, conduct may be
found to violate the statute after the fact; criminal sanctions imposed
without inquiry into intent could result in too much deterrence and
would serve to regulate corporate behavior rather than punish corporate wrongdoing. 44
Thus, the Court's reference to the vagaries of rule of reason analysis underscores the policy pronouncements favoring a mens rea requirement. Further, in characterizing much of the behavior proscribed by
41. In Brighton, even though the court held that proof of knowledge that the intended conduct was unlawful was not required, it was pointed out that the defendants' bids were accompanied by affidavits stating that the bidder had not agreed, colluded, or otherwise restrained free
competitive bidding. 598 F.2d at 1105 n.l. Presumably, the signing of such affidavits would have
proved the defendants' knowledge of the probable consequences of their acts, had the Gypsum
standard been followed.
42. 438 U.S. at 437, citing Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
43. 438 U.S. at 438.
44. Id at 442.
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the Sherman Act as "often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of
socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct," the
Court specifically excepted per se conduct. 45 The apparent difference
to the Court between per se and rule of reason conduct for intent purposes is underscored by the effort the Court took to signal that the conduct scrutinized in Gypsum, exchanges of price information, was not a
4 6

per se offense.

Much of the criticism of Gypsum has thus far centered around the
Court's apparent disregard of precedent. 4 7 An early antitrust decision,
UnitedStates v. Patten4 8 had generally been interpreted, both in a section 1 and section 2 context, as obviating the need to prove specific
intent by establishing a presumption that conspirators intend the necessary and direct consequences of their acts.4 9 The Gypsum opinion,
which seems to directly contradict Patten, made no mention of Patten
50
or subsequent decisions.
The Third Circuit in Gillen, cognizant of the Supreme Court precedent negating the requirement of intent in criminal antitrust cases,
argued that the Court's citation, in Gypsum, of United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co.," a price-fixing case following the Patten rationale,
acknowledged that price-fixing cases are an exception to the mens rea
rule. The Gillen court was not persuaded that Gypsum was intended to
change the long-established rule of law on price-fixing cases, instead
45. Id at 441.
46. Id at 441 n. 16. The Court's statement that exchanges of price information is not a per se
offense is surprising in view of the uncertainty that has followed the decision in United States v.
Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Although Justice Fortas, concurring in Container, expressed his view that nofperse rule for price exchanges had been established by the majority, id. at
338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring) others were not so certain. See Meeting Competition, supra note 16,
at 1490 (per se rule established); What Really Happened, supra note 16, at 654 (modified per se rule
established). Compare Kefauver, The Legality ofDisseminationof Market Data by Trade Associations. What Does Container Hold?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 785-86, 791 (1977) (no per se rule);
Note, Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors. The
Container Corporation Case, 68 MICH. L. REv. 720, 730-31 (1970) (no per se rule). The Supreme
Court itself prior to Gypsum, had indicated that the "dissemination of price information" is not
itselfaperse offense. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975). Seealso
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). Compare United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S.
371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
47. See Handler, supra note 16, at 1399; Putting a Lid, supra note 39, at 432-33.
48. 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
49. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942); United
States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977):
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960).
50. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, did recognize the precedent of
Patten. 438 U.S. at 475-76 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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voicing its belief that the "Court's statement in Gypsum on intent was
born out of a concern for borderline violations and was not meant to
modify past precedent on price-fixing conspiracies .... 52
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Brighton seemed unaware of the
strong precedent supporting its position.5 3 The court of appeals distinguished Gypsum by reference to factual differences which, it asserted, rendered Gypsum inapplicable toper se offenses. However, the
court's opinion is lacking in policy or case analysis. Arguably, the
court reached the correct result but for somewhat obscure reasons.
This obscurity is at least partly bred by the uncertain precedent established by the Supreme Court in Gypsum.
Irrespective of deficiencies in the Brighton opinion, the Seventh
Circuit is in the mainstream with other circuits in its restriction of Gypsum's intent requirement to rule of reason prosecutions. The burden of
proving intent in per se cases is probably minimal; thus, it can be argued that the limitation imposed is unimportant. However, Brighton
and subsequent decisions assure that the influence of Gypsum in criminal antitrust proceedings will be slight since the great majority of all
criminal antitrust prosecutions concern per se offenses.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND SECTION

5(a)

OF THE CLAYTON ACT

In Illinois v. GeneralPaving Co.,5 the Seventh Circuit reversed an
aberrational district court decision which had permitted the use of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel against defendants in a private treble
damage action because of the defendants' prior conviction in a criminal
antitrust proceeding based on the same facts. 55 In reversing, the Seventh Circuit ruled that section 5(a) of the Clayton Act 56 precludes 57the
operation of common law collateral estoppel in the antitrust field.
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a prior final judgment in favor of the government in a civil or criminal antitrust proceeding shall be prima facie evidence against the defendants to the
original suit in any subsequent private actions.5 8 The doctrine of col52. 599 F.2d at 544.
53. The court did cite Socony- Vacuum, but only for the proposition that a price maintenance
agreement is a per se violation. 598 F.2d at 1106.
54. 590 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. Illinois v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., 442 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Ill. 1977). Huckaba did
not appeal from the district court's order and was thus bound by it. 590 F.2d at 681 n.l.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1976).
57. 590 F.2d at 683.
58. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereinafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
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lateral estoppel provides generally that an issue of law or fact litigated
and determined by a final judgment is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties whether based on the same or a different
claim. 59 Traditionally, the so-called mutuality rule restricted application of the doctrine to situations in which both parties in the second
60
action were also parties, or in privity with parties, to the prior action.
However, the courts have increasingly abandoned the mutuality requirement and have permitted "defensive" collateral estoppel against a
plaintiff by a defendant not a party to the prior action 6' and "offensive"
collateral estoppel against a defendant by a plaintiff not a party to the
62
prior action.
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under Section 4A as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered
before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under
Section 4A.
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). Three principal types of antitrust suits are contemplated by the Clayton
Act. The United States Attorney General is authorized to enforce the antitrust laws by bringing
criminal or equitable proceedings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9, 25 (1976). Such suits are generally called
"government enforcement actions" and must be brought "in the public interest." A "private
treble damage action" may be brought by private parties to recover damages caused by a defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. Id. § 15. Private injunctive relief is also authorized. Id. § 26.
The United States is now permitted to bring suit to recover actual damages for injuries suffered to
its business or property from antitrust violations. Id. § 15(a). However, section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that the prima facie presumption is inapplicable to judgments obtained in government damage actions.
59. "Collateral estoppel" is defined in the Second Restatement of Judgments as: "When an
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Thus, a
court will estop a party "unless [he] has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
first action or unless other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the
issue." Id. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See also id at 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. i, 1973). See
generaly Brousseau, A Reader's Guide to the Proposed Changes in the Preclusion Provisions ofthe
Restatement of Judgments, II TULSA L.J. 305, 322-29 (1976).
60. See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), overruled, 402 U.S. 350 (1971); Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
61. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950);
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895
(1942); Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (collecting
cases).
62. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). For discussions of the erosion of the mutuality requirement see Currie, Civil
Procedure.- The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppet Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and JoinderofParties,68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968); Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and
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Allowing a private antitrust plaintiff to invoke offensive collateral
estoppel against a defendant who has unsuccessfully defended a prior
government enforcement suit goes beyond the statutory language of
section 5(a). 63 In that circumstance, the prior judgment has conclusive
effect rather than merely creating a prima facie presumption about issues previously litigated. The defendant is precluded from relitigating
issues decided adversely to him in the first suit instead of merely facing
a presumption on those issues. 64 Thus, if the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applied instead of the prima facie presumption of section 5(a),
a subsequent private antitrust plaintiff can typically obtain summary
judgment on the issue of liability, needing then only to show antitrust
injury6 5 from defendant's offense to recover treble damages.
In this context, a court must decide whether the prima facie language of section 5(a) preempts application of the common law principles of collateral estoppel or permits the giving of conclusive effect to
judgments obtained in government enforcement proceedings. Although several commentators have argued that collateral estoppel is
not precluded by section 5(a), 66 the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois in Illinois v. Huckaba &
Sons Construction Co. 67 was apparently the first to apply this interprethe Seventh Amendment. The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1002 (1979). Note,
The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485
(1974).
63. Section 5(a) deals only with offensive collateral estoppel in an antitrust suit by a third
party against a defendant subject to a prior antitrust judgment. Several courts have permitted
defensive collateral estoppel against an antitrust plaintiff, relying on Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See, e.g., Poster Exchange, Inc.
v. National Screen Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976);
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1974); Raitport v. Commercial Banks, 391 F. Supp. 584, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A defendant invoking defensive collateral
estoppel would seek to bind a plaintiff to issues of law and fact decided against it in a prior action.
Following the rationale of Blonder-Tongue, the defendant would not have to have been a party to
the prior action to assert the doctrine.
64. The prima facie language of section 5(a) in essence shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant on the issues covered by the presumption. See Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d
680, 681 (7th Cir. 1979). But see Note, Antitrust Enforcement By PrivateParties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1040 (1952).
65. See text accompanying notes 85-102 infra.
66. Langsdorf, United States as Antitrust DamagePlaintfl." MistreatedStepchildof the Parens
Patriae, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 187, 202-12 (1971); McWilliams, FederalAntitrustDecrees. Should
They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a Subsequent PrivateAction?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as McWilliams]; Comment, The Use of Government Judgments in PrivateAntitrust Litigation:
Clayton Act Section 5(a), CollateralEstoppel, and Jury Trial,43 U. CHI. L. REv. 338 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Government Judgments]; Note, Section 5(a) ofthe Clayton Act andthe use of Collateral Estoppel by a Private Plaintiffin a Treble Damage Action, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 74 (1973); Note,
Closing an Antitrust Loophole CollateralEffectfor Nolo Pleasand Government Settlements, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1334 (1969).

67. 442 F. Supp. 56, 59 (S.D. Ill. 1977). In contrast, a number of courts have refused to give
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tation.
In Huckaba, the defendants were found guilty by a jury of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Subsequently, the State of Illinois
filed a treble damage action against the same defendants and moved
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The district
court decided that Illinois could properly invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent the defendants from asserting any defenses,
rejecting the defendants' argument that section 5(a) made the earlier
judgment only prima facie evidence of liability and prevented the ap68
plication of collateral estoppel.
In support of its conclusion, the district court referred to the legislative history of section 5(a). In so doing, the court noted that Congress
seriously considered making prior judgments conclusive evidence in a
subsequent action. 69 Apparently, Congress resisted this temptation because of fears that conclusiveness might run afoul of due process since
there would be no mutuality of parties. 70 Thus, the court concluded
that Congress intended section 5(a) to provide a minimum standard
and that common law rules more favorable to private antitrust plaintiffs could be utilized as they became available. According to the district court, since collateral estoppel has passed constitutional muster,
71
antitrust plaintiffs should have access to it.
The district court was not persuaded that the failure of subsequent
congressional attempts to amend the Clayton Act by replacing the
prima facie standard with a conclusiveness test indicated a change in
congressional intent. The court did not see "how inaction by Congress
in the 1950's can shed light on what it did do in 1914."72 In addition,
the court found dicta in two other district court decisions which it beconclusive effect to government enforcement actions in subsequent private actions. See Purex
Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 453 F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065
(1972); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 332 F.2d 346,
359 (3d Cir. 1964), a'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp.
312, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1953), a'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954); Deluxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban &
Katz Corp., 95 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. IlI. 1951); Zuckerman v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
119531 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 67,468 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
68. The district court initially reserved the entry of partial summary judgment for sixty days,
so that the parties could establish whether the facts were the same as in the prior action. 442 F.
Supp. at 59-60. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiffs motion after concluding that the
actions were brought on the same facts. 590 F.2d at 681.
69. 442 F. Supp. at 57.
70. Id at 58.
71. Id at 57-58.
72. Id at 58. The court's reasoning here is enigmatic at best, since Congress did enact a
prima facie standard in 1914. It is perplexing to assert that congressional enactment of a prima
facie standard together with the failure of Congress to subsequently change the standard evinces a
congressional intent that prima facie should only be a minimum test.
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lieved supported its interpretation of the legislative history. 7 3
In reversing, the Seventh Circuit took sharp exception to the lower
court's characterization of the legislative history of section 5(a). The
court of appeals did not share the trial court's view that the 1914 Congress intended the prima facie language to establish only a minimum
standard, pointing out that Congress, had it so intended, "could easily
have provided that enforcement judgments would have at least aprima
74
facie effect. ....
In addition, the Seventh Circuit viewed the refusal of Congress to
change the standard in the 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act as
dispositive on the question of intent. 75 The amendment to section 5(a)
76
specifically included the United States as a possible damage plaintiff.
At the same time, the court noted that Congress rejected a proposal to
make the presumption accorded to government enforcement judgments
conclusive, instead reenacting the prima facie standard both as applied
77 It
to subsequent private and subsequent government damage suits.
was observed that later efforts to change the presumption had failed,
including a proposal before the 1978 Congress. 78 The court further
pointed out that the conclusiveness standard was rejected by Congress
in 1955, after the Supreme Court had applied collateral estoppel in
favor of the government in a civil injunctive action against defendants
previously convicted of Sherman Act violations, thus "further demon.

73. 1d at 59. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 185 (E.D. Pa.
1976); McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 393 F. Supp. 256, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1975). But see
the Seventh Circuit's treatment of these cases at 590 F.2d 680, 682. Compare Purex Corp. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), a/I'd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 288
(9th Cir. 197 1), which the Huckaba trial court characterized as "bottomed on an unsound foundation." 442 F. Supp. at 59.
74. 590 F.2d at 683 (emphasis in original).
75. Id at 682-83.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). In 1955, Congress also enacted section 4A of the Clayton Act
which authorizes the government to recover civil damages in an antitrust action. Id. § 15(a).
77. 590 F.2d at 682-83. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 5(a), from
1914 forward, see Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Offensive Collateral]. The
proposal to give government enforcement judgments conclusive effect was introduced in Congress
in 1950 and finally rejected when the 1955 amendments were enacted. See 590 F.2d at 683 n.5.
Congressional opposition to the conclusive effect proposal was apparently based not on constitutional concerns but rather on a feeling that conclusiveness would be too harsh on antitrust defendants. Id See Offensive Collateral, supra, at 550-51. Pre-amendment commentators, although
disagreeing about the merit of the prima facie standard, generally believed that there was no
constitutional obstacle to adopting a conclusiveness standard. See Note, Government Antitrust
Judgments as Evidence in Private Actions, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1952) (conclusive presumption would not help plaintiffs more than prima facie standard and would prolong government enforcement litigation); Note, Clayton Act Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors, 61 YALE
L.J. 417, 425-26 (1952) (conclusiveness would preclude wasteful litigation, encourage private litigants and lead to more settlements of enforcement suits).
78. 590 F.2d at 683, citing H.R. 7647, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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strat[ing] that section 5(a) was intended to preempt the common law
' '79
rule of collateral estoppel.
The General Paving decision is the first to confront directly the
question of whether section 5(a) permits courts to give conclusive effect
to antitrust judgments obtained in government enforcement actions. A

number of courts have previously refused to give judgments in government enforcement actions conclusive effect in subsequent private suits
by relying on section 5(a), 80 but they have typically assumed, rather
than analyzed and concluded, that section 5(a) precludes the use of collateral estoppel in antitrust actions.
In confronting the issue in GeneralPaving, the Seventh Circuit eschewed the policy arguments propounded by commentators and rested
8
its decision almost solely on its interpretation of legislative intent. '
However, the court's decision seems to implicitly reject the argument
that allowing a conclusiveness standard would merely advance the
original congressional intent to stimulate private suits so as to deter
79. 590 F.2d at 683 n.4. In Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293
(1934), the Supreme Court held that the government in a civil action for injunctive relief was
entitled to assert conclusiveness as to the defendants' participation in a conspiracy, based upon the
defendants' prior conviction of Sherman Act violations. The Seventh Circuit in GeneralPaving
concluded that the 1955 re-enactment of the prima facie standard of section 5(a) preempted the
government's judicially-established common law right of estoppel. 590 F.2d at 682-83 n.4. See
also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Offensive Collateral,supra note 77, at 553.
80. See cases cited in note 67 supra. See also Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d
709, 725 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (1950); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 64-65 (D. Minn. 1966),
aff'dsub nom., Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967).
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court held that section
5(a) bars the use of common law collateral estoppel in a government damage suit against a defendant who has had a judgment entered against him in a prior government enforcement suit.
The court recognized that under common law principles the defendant would have been estopped
from relitigating. However, the court read the 1955 amendments as expressly limiting the use of
judgments from government enforcement actions in later government damage suits to the prima
facie standard. Id at 1907-98. In Huckaba, the district court thought Grinnellwas distinguishable
apparently because the United States was seeking damages under section 4A of the Clayton Act
while the State of Illinois was treated as a private party litigant under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
442 F. Supp. at 58. Private plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages while the United States is
limited to actual damages by section 4A. However, the relevance of this distinction on the prima
facie presumption of section 5(a), which is expressly applicable to both types of plaintiffs, is problematical.
81. See, e.g., articles cited in note 66 supra. See also W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN
ACTION 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940); Hardy, The Eviscerationof Section 5 ofthe Clayton Act,
49 GEo. L.J. 44 (1960); Loevinger, PrivateAction-The Strongest PillarofAntitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 174-75 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loevinger]; Comment, ProposedAmendmentto Section 5(a) of Clayton Act Would Increase Evidentiary Aidfor Subsequent Litigants, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 518, 524-27 (1964); Note, Clayton Act, Section 5. Aid to Treble Damage Suitors?, 61 YALE
L.J. 417, 425-26 (1952). But see Note, Government Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in PrivateActions, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1400 (1952); Note, Section 5(a) of the ClaytonAct and Offensive Collateral
Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541 (1976).
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anticompetitive conduct. 82 It may indeed be ironic, as suggested by one
commentator, that contemporary collateral estoppel doctrine would
provide greater incentive to private plaintiffs than does the statutory
formulation originally enacted to achieve that purpose.8 3 However, the
Seventh Circuit has elected, particularly in view of the repeated legislative denials of the conclusiveness standard,8 4 to allow Congress, rather
than the courts, to perform the legislative function.
ANTITRUST INJURY/STANDING

Section 4 of the Clayton Act establishes a private cause of action
for treble damages to anyone "injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . ,"85 Together
with section 5(a), 86 section 4 was intended to encourage private en87
forcement of the antitrust laws and deter anticompetitive conduct.
Private litigants were intended to supplement the "public interest" enforcement of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission,
88
serving as "private attorneys general.
82. The original purpose of section 5 (now section 5(a)) of the Clayton Act was to aid private
plaintiffs in recovering treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws. Prior to 1914, private
antitrust actions, because of the cost of litigation and the financial resources of large corporate
defendants, were scarce and rarely successful. See HEARINGS ON S. 2512 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 2, 3 (1966).
83. See Government Judgments, supra note 66, at 374. See also McWilliams, supra note 66, at
17.
84. On the effect of the congressional silence in refusing to repeal a judicially-created antitrust exemption, see Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the
Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REV. 611, 622-26 (1977).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The original treble damage provision was incorporated in section
7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). Although that provision was superseded by section 4 of
the Clayton Act, it is generally agreed that the purpose of the treble damage remedy remains
unchanged. See notes 88 and 89 and accompanying text infra; 51 CONG. REC. 9164 (1914); H.R.
REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). See generally Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). See text accompanying notes 54-84 supra.
87. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Lehrman
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). The effectiveness of section 4 actions to deter and compensate is discussed in Loevinger, supra note 81;
Maclntrye, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 113
(1962); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319
(1973); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties.- Analysis of Development in the Treble
Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952). But see Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble
Damage Suits. Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. REV. 286 (1973); Parker, Treble Damage Action-A
Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971). For a discussion of
the deterrent effect of section 5(a) "coattail suits," see Tyler, Private Antitrust Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 296-97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Tyler]. The author
concludes that the additional deterrent effect of section 5(a) suits facilitates government enforcement activities and thus argues for a liberal antitrust standing law. Id
88. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
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A literal reading of section 4 would require only some kind of

causal connection between an injury to plaintiffs "business or prop89
erty" and an antitrust violation in order to confer standing to sue.
However, most courts have been wary of such a literal interpretation,
recognizing that a mere causal connection requirement between injury
and infraction "would result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of
the private weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by
Congress." 90 Accordingly, courts have sought to limit the scope of section 4 by construing its "by reason of" language to require not only
factual causation between violation and injury, but also legal causation. 9'
The courts have typically manifested the legal causation requirement for standing by adopting one of two approaches: direct injury or
target area. The direct injury test focuses on the relationship between
the alleged antitrust violator and the claimant. 92 Typically, if the plainParts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring in result); Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 386 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Cf. Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205
(E.D.N.Y. 1942) (private action alleging gasoline price-fixing in violation of Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts); Quemos Theatre Co., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950
(D.N.J. 1940) (court ruling on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 motion to produce records for
inspection).
89. See Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1958); Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948). See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957), where the Supreme Court stated that courts
"should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth
by Congress ..
." Accord, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948). See Tyler, supra note 87 (arguing for a literal interpretation of section 4).
90. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,406 U.S. 930 (1972). See also SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,
407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has
noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (class actions) has greatly expanded the significance
of the private treble damage action, particularly for consumers. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S.
Ct. 2326, 2333 n.6, 2334 (1979).
91. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe
lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an
antitrust violation." Id at 262-63 n. 14 (citations omitted). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
Some courts have focused on the "injury to business or property" language of section 4 in
analyzing the standing question, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). This had added to the confusion regarding the standing and antitrust injury questions. See text accompanying notes 125-34 infra. The
Supreme Court, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979), recently focused on the "business or property" language in holding that consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased
for personal use as a result of antitrust violations have sustained an antitrust injury under section
4.
92. See, e.g., Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 306 (W.D. Colo.
1969); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
See Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 333 (1974); Comment,
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tiff does not have direct business contact with the offender or if an intermediate antitrust victim separates the plaintiff and the defendant,
the suit will be dismissed for lack of standing. 93 Although the courts
recognize that the claimant's injury may be factually related to the antitrust violation, they typically characterize the purported harm as "indi'94
rect," "speculative," "remote," "incidental," or "consequential.
In contrast, the target area test for antitrust standing focuses on the

relationship between the injury and the purpose and effect of the alleged violation. Two steps are generally required: identification of the
areas of the economy affected by the antitrust offense and ascertainment of whether the claimed injury occurred within that area. 95 Thus,
a plaintiff has standing under the target area approach if his claimed
losses fall within the area of the economy injured by defendant's anticompetitive conduct.
The target area test was, in part, a response to what some courts
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 546, 560-62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Malamud
Comment].
93. The direct injury rule for antitrust standing arose from two early private antitrust cases,
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, (3d Cir. 1910) and Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
166 F. 820 (2d Cir. 1909). In Loeb, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's illegal monopoly
bankrupted a corporation of which the plaintiff was a stockholder. The plaintiff claimed injury
from his loss of stock, from claims he held against the bankrupt company which were made
worthless, and to his personal credit. The Third Circuit refused to permit recovery for such "indirect, remote and consequential" injury. 183 F. at 709. In Ames, a shareholder of a corporation
also brought suit for antitrust damages incurred by the corporation. The court refused to confer a
right of action upon the stockholder because of possible sextuple damage liability for an unlawful
act. 166 F. at 824. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86
YALE L.J. 809, 813-16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Berger & Bernstein]; Pollock, Standing to Sue,
Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-OnDoctrine, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 5 (1966); Note, Standing to
Suefor Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
94. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (indirect, remote, and consequential); Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 53 (D. Del. 1974)
(speculative, indirect, and remote); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F.
Supp. 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), affdmem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (remote). See also In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973). Berger & Bernstein, supra note 93, at 816-19.
95. See Bosse v. Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 565 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1977); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972);
Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923
(1971); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51,
54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also in re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See
generally Areeda, Antitrust Damage Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1127, 1133 n.36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Areedal; Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under
Section 4 fthe Clayton Act. DeterminationofStanding in Light ofthe Alleged Antitrust Violation,
25 AM. U.L. REv. 795, 802-07 (1976); Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 374, 382-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sherman].
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believed as the unjustified arbitrariness of the direct injury approach. 96
Under direct injury, the existence of another antitrust victim dealing
more directly with the defendant or operating between the plaintiff and
the defendant may foreclose the treble damage remedy to the plaintiff,
despite economic harm to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's
conduct. 97 The standard has been criticized as "conclusory" ' 98 and as
"creating a competitors only standing doctrine for antitrust." 9 9 While
there is disagreement about the reach of the target area test, 0 0 it is
generally believed by those courts adopting the approach that it more
accurately pinpoints those injured by a defendant's antitrust violations
without unnecessarily excluding, because of formalistic criterion, those
96. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,481 F.2d 122, 127-29 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1973), citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969) (repudiating the direct injury
approach and, at least inferentially, approving the target area approach); Midway Enterprises, Inc.
v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Md., 1974). Of course, the distinction
between direct injury and target area analysis has often been blurred by the courts. See, e.g.,
Karseal v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v.
Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See generally Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562, 565-66 (1931).
97. The courts have taken irreconciliable positions in applying direct injury. Compare Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) with Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), af'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954) and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Melrose
Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,352 U.S. 890 (1956) with Reibert v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). See Berger &
Bernstein, supra note 93, at 819-30; Note, Standing to Sue in PrivateAntitrust Litigation: Circuits in
Conflict, 10 IND. L. REV. 532 (1977).
98. Inre Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied,414 U.S. 1045 (1973). The case is noted in Comment, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 655 (1974); Note,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 723 (1974).
99. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., [19751 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
60,373, 66,628 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See also Sherman, supra note 95, at 380-82.
100. For example, the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit have expressly disagreed about
the necessity that the plaintiff fall within the area which it could be reasonably foreseen would be
affected by the illegal activity. Compare Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971)
with Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923
(1971) (adopting foreseeability requirement and disagreeing with conclusion of Second Circuit in
Fields). However, after Mulvey, the Ninth Circuit's position on foreseeability has seemingly wavered. Compare In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29
(9th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 1045 (1973) with Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 426
(9th Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit has steadfastly rejected the foreseeability test as too broad.
See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.2
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
Also, interchangeable use of the terms "target" and "target area" has created confusion. For
instance, it is unclear if a plaintiff within the target area can sue whether or not he can be identified as a target of the alleged violation. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th
Cir. 1975); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.
1967); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418-19 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Automotive Dealers'
Ass'n, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-87 (D. Conn. 1974).
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deserving recovery.' 0'
Standing issues should ideally be determined by the facts of each
case. Target area analysis looks to the economic effects of each defendant's conduct and measures the impact of that conduct upon the complaining party. This fact orientation is preferable to direct injury
formalism which may exclude a party for reasons contrary to antitrust's
02
purpose of compensating those injured by anticompetitive conduct.
It is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit, which has spoken infrequently on the antitrust standing question, adheres to the direct injury
or target area approach. 0 3 The Ninth Circuit, in reviewing the Seventh Circuit's position, expressed uncertainty but concluded that it was
closer to the target area approach.'0 4 More recently, in Lupia v. Stella
D'Oro Biscuit Co., 105 the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to resolve
the uncertainty but declined to do so.
Lupia involved a suit by a former exclusive distributor of the defendant's ethnic bakery products. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant granted a five percent discount to retail chain stores, as opposed to
independently-owned stores, and then had charged the distributorplaintiff for the discount. 06 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
company had engaged in price discrimination in violation of section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act since it had not made the discount
0 7
available to independent purchasers.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on all counts. 0 8 In dismissing the plaintiffs price discrimi101. See notes 99 and 100 supra. See generally Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4. A
Proverbial Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REV. 73 (1972); Comment, Private Plaintiffs Standing Under
Clayton Act Section 4: Clothing the Naked Emperor, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 588 (1976).
102. The problems of target area analysis should not be overlooked, however. See note 100
supra. For criticisms of target analysis, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 93, and Tyler, supra
note 87. A third, yet broader, "zone of interest" approach was articulated in Malamud v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). The court expressly rejected the target area and direct
injury tests as too harsh with regard to plaintiffs. However, other courts have not generally followed Malamud. See note 143 infra.
103. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,375 U.S. 834 (1963); Sandidge v. Rogers, 256 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1958); Congress Bldg.
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957). District court decisions include Amerace
Corp. v. USM Corp., [19751 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,255 (N.D. 111.1975); J.O. Pollock Co. v.
L.G. Balfour Co., [19731 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 74,339 (N.D. 111.1972).
104. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
105. 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
106. 586 F.2d at 1167.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The plaintiff also alleged that defendant had violated section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, section I of the Sherman Act, and section 3 of the Clayton
Act. These claims were also disposed of by summary judgment. 586 F.2d at 1163.
108. No. 72 C 738 (N.D. Ill., May 31, 1977) (unpublished opinion).
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nation claim, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff, as a distributor,
lacked standing to challenge any price discrimination imposed on retailers and that the plaintiff had alleged no injury to himself or his business resulting from the defendant's discriminatory pricing. 0 9 On the
standing question, the trial judge applied the target area test, finding
that the proper parties to complain were the retailers who did not receive a discount. Plaintiff had not alleged an antitrust injury, the court
held, because he failed to show that he could have sold to chain stores
if the discount had not been granted them."10
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding it unnecessary to choose either the direct injury or target area approaches to standing."' The
court specifically eschewed following the target area approach of the
trial court, instead ruling that the "plaintiff could not prevail under any
of [the various section 4 standing and injury doctrines]." ' 1 2 The court
then illustrated its holding by pointing out that, had the target area test
been appropriated, the plaintiff would fail because the independent retailers who were discriminated against "solely occupied the 'target
area.' "1113
The Seventh Circuit believed that the procedural posture of the
case justified its generalized holding. Because a motion for summary
judgment was involved, the Seventh Circuit was not confined to threshold issues such as standing but could "invoke any reason why a claim
or defense must succeed or fail."' "4 Rather, the issue for decision, according to the court, was "whether plaintiff has alleged any facts demonstrating a violation that 'fits' within the requirements for an antitrust
recovery, a question of law that can be answered by the court."" 5 The
court assumed that all facts stated by the plaintiff were true and determined that the plaintiff was unable to raise factual issues that could
109. Id at 5-10.
110. Id at 7.
111. 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978). The defendants had argued that the plaintiff should be
excluded under both the direct injury and target area tests. Brief for Appellee at 24-25, Lupia v.
Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978).
112. Id. at 1169. The district court was thought to have adopted the target area approach. Id
at 1168.
113. Id at 1169. The traditional detrimental effect of secondary line price discrimination
(supplier discriminating against different purchasers) is upon the disfavored purchaser. See notes
152-55 and accompanying text infra. See generally Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws. The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1961).
114. 586 F.2d at 1169.
115. Id at 1166. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment may be
granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." See Rogers, Summary Judgments in Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation,
10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 667 (1979).

ANTITRUST

support a grant of standing or a claim of antitrust injury.' 16
The defendant's motion for summary judgment, then, enabled the
court to avoid giving definitive content to the circuit's antitrust standing
requirements, since the plaintiff was unable to buttress his complaint
with facts which would have met any standing approach. Paradoxically, the Seventh Circuit provided a substantial review of antitrust
standing and injury doctrine, recognizing that a good deal of confusion
and uncertainty about the relationship of the two exists.' 7 However,
because of the procedural stance of the case and the plaintiffs insufficient pleadings, the Seventh Circuit declined to address that problem as
well.
The requirement that a private antitrust claimant prove an antitrust injury is also embedded in the section 4 language granting recovery for injuries caused "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws. . . ."I'8 Recently, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 1 9 the Supreme Court clarified the concept by defining an antitrust injury as an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.' 120 The Court in Brunswick further explained that "[tihe injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation."12'
In Brunswick, the defendant, a large bowling equipment manufacturer, had acquired and begun operating several bowling alleys that
had defaulted on equipment purchased on credit from the defendant. 122 Competitors of some of the acquired alleys brought suit claiming a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiffs alleged
that the entry of a "giant" company like Brunswick with a "deep pock116. 586 F.2d at 1169. "[Mlere recitation of antitrust claims in a complaint does not render
that complaint immune from summary disposition, if uncontradicted facts show otherwise." Id
at 1167.
117. Id at 1168-69.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
119. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
120. Id at 489. See also GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), cited in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 426 U.S.
477, 489 n.14 (1977). See notes 122-28 and accompanying text infra.
121. 429 U.S. at 489.
122. When the bowling industry declined in the early 1960's, Brunswick experienced difficulty
in collecting on its credit sales made in more prosperous times. By the end of 1964, more than one
quarter of Brunswick's accounts were more than ninety days delinquent. Although repossessions
increased substantially, Brunswick had difficulty selling or leasing the repossessed equipment. As
a result, Brunswick was itself in serious financial difficulty; it had borrowed almost $250,000,000 to
finance its credit sales. Thus, Brunswick began acquiring and operating the defaulting bowling
alleys when their equipment could not be resold and a profit could be made from operating the
centers. Id at 479-80.
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et" from its manufacturing business into a market of "pygmy" bowling
alley operators might lessen horizontal retail competition. 123 The
plaintiffs' injury allegedly derived from a loss of profits occasioned by
the acquisitions. The plaintiffs' theory was that, but for the defendant's
take-overs, the acquired alleys would have gone out of business, thus
24
permitting the plaintiffs to acquire a greater share of the market.'
Even assuming a direct causal relationship between the acquisitions and the plaintiffs' loss in Brunswick, the Court found that the
125
plaintiffs' injury theory was impermissible under the antitrust laws.
The Court pointed out that every acquisition could cause economic
change, but only acquisitions which are likely to produce anticompetitive effects violate section 7.126 The Court noted that if Brunswick's
acquisitions were unlawful, it was because a deep pocket had entered a
market predominated by small competitors. However, the plaintiffs'
injury-loss of income-bore no relationship to the size of the competitors or the entering company. The plaintiffs would have suffered the
same loss had the bowling centers been acquired by small parent
firms. 12 7 The acquisitions only deprived the plaintiffs of the fruits of
increased concentration. Consequently, the injury was not the kind of
harm the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, nor did it flow from
128
that which made the acquisitions unlawful.
123. Id at 482. Prior to the suit, Brunswick had acquired 222 bowling alleys, 54 of which it
either sold or closed. As a result, Brunswick was by far the largest operator of bowling centers,
with over five times as many centers as the next largest competitor. Id at 480.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), renders a merger unlawful where it may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Thus, section 7 prohibits mergers
where "there is a reasonable probability that the acquisition is likely to result in the condemned
restraints." United States v. E. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957). It is
designed to arrest restraints of trade through merger in their "incipiency." Id at 589. See also
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577-79 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962). See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MERGERS AND
THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON
ACT-POLICY AND LAW (MONOGRAPH No. 1, 1977) [hereinafter referred to as A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION]. Comment, Treble Damage Actionsfor Violations of Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 404 (1971).

124. 429 U.S. at 481.
125. The lower court had held that the acquisition was unlawful under section 7 and that the
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for any loss causally linked to the mere presence of an
illegal entrant in the market. NBO Industries Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). The Third Circuit's opinion is criticized in Areeda,
supra note 95, at 1130-36 (prior to the Supreme Court's reversal).
126. 429 U.S. at 487. See also Carlson Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959, 962 (8th
Cir. 1974).
127. 429 U.S. at 487.
128. Id at 487-88. It is arguable that the Brunswick "antitrust injury" should be limited to
section 7 cases, particularly because that statute deals with potential or probable anticompetitive
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The Brunswick decision has created confusion about the relationship of antitrust injury to antitrust standing doctrine. Several courts
have seemingly treated the concepts as equivalent. In GAF Corp. v.
CircleFloor Co. ,129 a case cited with approval in Brunswick, 130 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted under either the standing or antitrust injury doctrines.' 3 1 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit in John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co. ,132 a case decided after Brunswick,
analyzed the standing and injury concepts as one. In granting summary judgment against a plaintiff who claimed to have lost a distributorship because of an illegal acquisition by the defendant, the Ninth
Circuit held that standing could not be conferred where "plaintiff just
prove[s] some injury and show[s] that this injury is within the affected
area of the economy."' 33 The Lenore court, relying heavily upon the
Brunswick injury analysis, denied the plaintiff standing, concluding
that "[e]ven though Lenore's injury may have. . . occurred 'by reason
of' the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur 'by reason of that which
34
made the acquisitions unlawful."'
A review of antitrust standing and antitrust injury cases suggests
that the procedural posture of a case often determines which doctrine
will be applied by the court. In pre-trial adjudications, a challenge to a
party's right to bring a section 4 suit typically evokes a standing analysis.35 In contrast, damage or injury issues are normally raised after the
plaintiff has had the opportunity to prove his harm from the alleged
effects. See note 123 supra. In that context, the awarding of treble damages may raise particular
problems. See 429 U.S. at 487. Some courts initially looked askance at awarding damages for
section 7 violations because only anticipated restraints of trade were involved. Highland Supply
Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v.
Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 717 (D. Hawaii 1964). More recently, however, parties
showing appropriate injury have been permitted to recover damages. See cases cited in A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 123, at 8-9 n.25. See also Handler, supra note 16, at 992-94.

129. 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
130. 429 U.S. at 489 n.14.
131. 463 F.2d at 759.
132. 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
133. 550 F.2d at 499.
134. Id at 500. The court focused on the lack of causation between the challenged acquisitions by the defendant and the plaintiff's injury. See notes 143-48 and accompanying text infra,
for a discussion of causation in the standing context. Since the terminations of the plaintiffs
distributorships "were not directly and proximately caused by the challenged acquisition," the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue. 550 F.2d at 499-500. Other recent cases relying on Brunswick in
determining a standing issue include Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1978); Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Juneau Square Corp.
v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See also Southern Concrete Co.
v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977);
Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
135. See cases cited in Sherman, supra note 95, at 377 nn.17-20.
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anticompetitive practices. 136
These procedural differences illustrate, to some extent, the different nature of the two doctrines. Antitrust standing is perceived generally as a threshold question of law which the court must decide. 13 7
Damage questions, on the other hand, are questions of fact for decision
by a jury. 138 Standing analysis should determine which plaintiffs are
proper parties for bringing suit. 139 Injury analysis should determine

whether those proper parties have incurred any injury compensable by
the antitrust laws. Thus, standing should be doctrinally broader; that
is, a party may have standing to sue without having sustained an anti-

trust injury.

40

As recent cases have demonstrated, however, the two doctrines
have a close kinship. 141 Both evolved from section 4 of the Clayton Act
and both implicitly limit treble damage liability. 42 Further, antitrust

standing, unlike standing in general, which is jurisdictional in nature
136. For example, in Brunswick,the defendant appealed an adverse jury verdict of $2,358,030.
429 U.S. at 481. The antitrust injury question also arose after a jury verdict in another recent
Seventh Circuit decision, Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). It is interesting to note that the court in Lupia v. Stella
D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979), considered the
injury question in the context of a pretrial motion for summary judgment, ruling that the flexibility of summary judgment permitted consideration of "any reason why a claim or defense must
succeed or fail." 586 F.2d at 1169. In Ohio-Seay, the defendant licensed its trademark to the
plaintiff, which manufactured and sold "Sealy" brand mattresses in territories for which itwas
"primarily responsible." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was effectively maintaining illeal exclusive territories, thus eliminating intrabrand competition by creating barriers which made
it very difficult for licensees to compete effectively outside its primary area. 585 F.2d at 828-29.
The defendant also had in its license agreements a right of first refusal before a licensee sold its
business. The right of refusal was exercised five times against the plaintiff company, which was
seeking to expand, although the right had never been exercised against any other licensee. Id at
829. The court found that the jury could have legitimately concluded that the exercise of the right
of first refusal was part of a scheme of market allocation, done to keep the plaintiff from expanding and engaging in intrabrand competition with other licensees. Id.at 832. Thus, the Seal,
court concluded that "the profits lost thereby do reflect injury of a type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and do flow directly from the anticompetitive scheme that made Sealy's acquisitions illegal." Id at 833. A more blatant system of licensing exclusive manufacturing and
sales territories had earlier been invalidated in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
137. See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498 (9th
Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
138. Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1978). See also OhioSealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 832 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 440 U.S. 930
(1979).
139. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 93, at 836.
140. See text accompanying notes 143-48 infra.
141. See notes 129-34 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has suggested that the
Supreme Court may consider the two "different sides of the same coin." Handler, supra note 16,
at 995. See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S.Ct. 2326 (1979).
142. Compare Calderone Enterprises, Inc. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) with Brunswick Corp. v.Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486-89 (1977).
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and derives from the constitutional requirement of "case or controversy,"' 143 involves elements of proximate causation. 44 Thus, antitrust
standing necessarily encompasses the element of injury since the rela45
tionship of the plaintiff to the defendant's illegal acts is paramount.1
That is, the plaintiff must allege facts, which if proved, will establish a
causal connection between the alleged violation and his injury. 14 6 This
causal connection differs, however, from proof of the actual "antitrust
injury." 14 7 Standing analysis, under the target area approach, serves to
identify parties as potential antitrust victims. Whether those parties
can prove that their actual injury is of "the type that the statute was
intended to forestall"' 4 8 is a separate question.
Brunswick is illustrative. The plaintiffs, as existing competitors,
were within the target area of the defendant's deep pocket acquisitions.
The plaintiffs had standing since a deep pocket entrant into a market of
pygmies may harm the pygmies' ability to compete, in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 14 9 However, the plaintiffs failed on the injury question because they were unable to relate their claimed injury to
143. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978). Typically, the constitutional case or controversy requirement mandates at least
a minimal element of personal interest to meet the standing criterion. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450 (1970); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973). In Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Supreme Court broadened the standing doctrine by finding standing where "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id at
153. Subsequently, in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth
Circuit applied the "zone of interests" test of Data Processing to a section 4 private antitrust
plaintiff. The court in Malamud rejected both the direct injury and target area test because they
"demanded too much from plaintiffs at the pleading stage" and confused standing with a "decision on the merits." 1d. at 1149. See Sherman, supra note 95; MalamudComment, supra note 92;
Note, Standing to Sue in Antitrust: The Application of Data Processing to Private Treble Damage
Actions, II TULSA L.J. 542 (1976). The zone of interests test has not generally been followed in
subsequent antitrust standing cases. See Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1169
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
144. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363
(9th Cir. 1955); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72, 90 (D. Hawaii 1969). Cf. Juneau
Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965, 969, (E.D. Wis. 1978) (causation is
not an element of standing). See generally Pollock, The "'njury"and "Causation" Elements of a
Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Pollock].
145. See Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd,
211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Pollock, supra note 144, at 693 n.9.
146. See Pollock, supra note 144, at 692 and cases cited therein.
147. That involves a question of fact for jury determination. See note 138 and accompanying
text supra.
148. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977), quoting Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967).
149. 429 U.S at 487.
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the anticompetitive consequences of the mergers. 150 Their loss of profits could not have been caused by anything proscribed by the antitrust
5
laws. ' '
Lupia is similarly instructive in a non-merger context. Although
the Seventh Circuit, following GAF, implied that standing and injury
may be synonymous for section 4 purposes, it proceeded to analyze the
15 2
two separately, concluding that plaintiff had established neither.
The plaintiff's lack of standing was grounded on the fact that the plaintiff, as a distributor, would not normally have been affected by the price
discrimination of a manufacturer to retailers. 53 The injury requirement was not met because the plaintiff could not show harm from the
anticompetitive effects of his required absorption of the five percent
rebate. Thus, the plaintiff was not harmed by that which made the
54
rebate unlawful. 1
Since plaintiff was not within the target area, he had no cognizable
antitrust injury. However, even a party within the target area, that is, a
disfavored retailer, would not necessarily be the subject of an antitrust
injury. Such a party could establish standing by virtue of its paying a
supplier a higher price for goods also sold to competitors of the disfavored purchaser. Antitrust injury follows only if the harm to the disfavored party stems from anticompetitive effects proscribed by section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The price discrimination must create a competitive disadvantage for the disfavored party by permitting
the favored purchaser to resell at a cheaper price. A disfavored pur150. id
151. The plaintiffs loss of profits had nothing to do with the size or "deep pocket" of the
acquiring firm but derived solely from the fact that the acquisitions maintained existing competition, a pro-competitive result. Id at 487-88. See Areeda, supra note 95, at 1133-34 n.36; Handler,
supra note 16, at 997. An analysis that would deny the plaintiffs standing because their loss of
profits did not result from the anticompetitive impact of the defendant's conduct would unnecessarily restrict the target area and confuse the legal question of standing with the fact question of
proof of antitrust damages. The plaintiffs were within the target area of the acquisitions. However, to establish antitrust injury, they would have had to show damages from attempting to compete with a deep pocket market entrant, not losses simply because of the fact of an acquisition in
the retail bowling market of which they were a part. This narrowing of the target area is precisely
what occurred in John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). The court there held that, "It is not enough to confer standing that
plaintiff'just prove some injury and show that this injury is within the affected area of the economy." 550 F.2d at 499.
152. 586 F.2d at 1168-69.
153. The court does, at one point, seem to adopt the target area approach. Id at 1169.
154. The court also noted that the "plaintiff was unable to raise an issue of fact that it could
have sold to the chains without the rebate." Id Although the court did not so indicate, the preceding statement must have related to a purported resale price maintenance claim, rather than the
price discrimination allegation. See Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976) (a resale price maintenance case which the Lupia court took
pains to distinguish).
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chaser's payment of a higher price for a product than his competitor is
155
not in itself sufficient to establish antitrust injury.
Reciprocal use of the doctrines of antitrust standing and injury
may often not alter the outcome of particular cases, since one without
injury often does not have standing to sue. However, such a practice
confuses legal causation with factual causation. Consequently, two
problems arise. Since standing questions are generally litigated before
trial, the plaintiff may be denied his opportunity to prove antitrust
damages before a jury. The fact of damage is then determined by the
legal concept of standing. Courts, wary of depriving parties of standing, may inadvertently expand the scope of antitrust injury and create
unwarranted liability under section 4.156
In Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 15 7 the Seventh Circuit was
presented with a plaintiff that could not establish antitrust standing or
injury. Although its opinion was ambiguous, the court did, at least indirectly, support the proposition that standing and injury are divisible
doctrines that often have distinct meaning to a private antitrust plaintiff. Hopefully, subsequent decisions will continue to recognize this difference.

155. See American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 498
(1964); Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965
(1957); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). A similar analysis is presented in Handler, supra note 16, at 992-93,
997.
156. See, e.g., NBO Industries Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975),
rev'd sub nom., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 420 U.S. 477 (1977). One pair of
commentators states that the courts' failure to properly confine antitrust standing imbues substantive antitrust law into threshold standing questions. See Areeda, supra note 95; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 93, at 835-40.
157. 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).

